

OCA 3487/88

## OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

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2. DD/Legislation		
3. DD/Senate Affairs		
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Name/Date

OCA 3487/88

*Additional*

VIEWS

OF

REPRESENTATIVES McEWEN, SHUSTER, HYDE, LIVINGSTON AND LUNGREN

**OCA FILE**

*H. R. SCOTT / Sen. McGowan  
Rep McEwen  
Rep Shuster  
Rep Hyde  
Rep Livingston  
Rep Lungren*

to the

REPORT BY THE

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

on

U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CONCERNS

These hearings touched only lightly upon the subject of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Such disclosures have become rampant and cause enormous damage to U.S. intelligence collection, intelligence liason relationships and U.S. foreign policy interests. In 1987, for instance, scores of confirmed, first-time intelligence leaks pertaining to CIA work were identified.

Vigorous steps should be taken to reverse this permissive, widespread culture. The Congress should pass legislation establishing criminal penalties for intentional unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Nonetheless, this would have little effect if investigations remain as perfunctory as they are at present.

-2-

Intelligence agencies often have claimed that only other executive agencies and the Congress are guilty of unauthorized disclosures. During the course of these investigations, we became convinced that even the Central Intelligence Agency has displayed a profound lack of interest in policing its own demonstrated problems, especially when these may involve prominent officials.

In response to the Howard espionage case, the CIA has made some much-needed improvements in its procedures and organization. We would not wish to imply, however, that the long-overdue creation of a Counterintelligence Center is necessarily an adequate or final answer.

Protection of "turf" has been an impediment to optimization and centralization of the entire U.S. counterintelligence effort. We remain concerned, for instance, about whether CIA's Counterintelligence Center has been given adequate authority over regional offices and about whether its location within the Directorate of Operations accords it sufficient independence within CIA.

The Counterintelligence Center probably is the only existing institution which can help centralize counterintelligence operations that cross agency and departmental lines. It has made some progress in this area, in part due to currently dominant personalities and an increased awareness of the gravity of the threat. However, its formal charter in this respect is very weak.

-3-


All agree that some salutary steps have been taken since 1985, both in personnel and information security and in overall counterintelligence policy. But we are greatly concerned that this is just a start, and that even the steps taken thus far are subject to reversal unless there is aggressive support at the highest levels both within departments and in the White House itself. As one witness observed with regard to personnel security:

"Therefore, although many initiatives were undertaken in 1985 and much progress was made during 1986 and 1987, those initiatives have now, for the most part, stalled. Rather than moving forward, we are currently undergoing a significant retrenchment."

The depth of past losses has been theoretically acknowledged, but has not penetrated to the extent that we are willing to take determined and consistent action. Investment in counterintelligence often is not seen as cost-effective. Major portions of the U.S. government still are not fundamentally serious about counterintelligence, although consciousness has been heightened in some quarters.



Bob McEwen  
Ranking Minority Member  
Subcommittee on Oversight  
and Evaluation




Bud Shuster  
Member, Subcommittee on  
Oversight and Evaluation



Henry J. Hyde  
Ranking Minority Member of  
Full Committee  
Member, Subcommittee on  
Oversight and Evaluation



Bob Livingston



Jany Lungren

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**PERMANENT SELECT  
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**OFFICIAL BUSINESS**

*Quinn Stokes*

CIA  
ATTN:

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